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CLASHES AND CONTINUITIES: 
BRIEF REFLECTIONS ON THE “NEW LOUISIANA LEGAL 
HISTORY” 
Seán Patrick Donlan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I’m a Louisiana native, but I’ve been away from the state for 
over a decade. In that time, I completed a Ph.D. (on Edmund 
Burke’s Legal Thought) at Trinity College Dublin and remained to 
teach law in Ireland. Most of my research has focused on 
comparative law, history, and legal history.1 Given my Louisiana 
legal background and these interests, comparative legal history is 
especially important to my work. Indeed, I’ve long wanted to 
return to Louisiana history, in particular to the unusual legal and 
social history of my own “Florida Parishes”. That research, on the 
laws and norms of Spanish West Florida in the early nineteenth 
century is underway, though it’s proceeding slowly.2 It has, 
however, drawn me back into the complex, sometimes convoluted, 
debates on Louisiana legal history. The bicentennial of Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 *  Lecturer, University of Limerick, Ireland; President, Juris Diversitas; 
General Secretary, World Society of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists; Chief Editor, 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY; Executive Council, European Society for 
Comparative Legal History. I want to thank those who read and commented on 
different versions of this note. The opinions expressed and errors made are mine 
alone.  
 1. Most recently, for example, I co-edited, with Michael Brown of the 
University of Aberdeen, THE LAWS AND OTHER LEGALITIES OF IRELAND, 1689-
1850 (Ashgate, London, 2011). My contribution to the collection was an article 
on Arthur Browne, an eighteenth-century, American-born civilian (a specialist 
in continental law) who taught civil law at Trinity College, practiced in both the 
admiralty and ecclesiastical courts and the courts of common law, and served in 
the Irish Parliament. 
 2. Seán P. Donlan, Entangled up in Red, White, and Blue: Spanish West 
Florida and the American Territory of Orleans, c1803-1810 in 
ENTANGLEMENTS IN LEGAL HISTORY: CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO GLOBAL 
LEGAL HISTORY (Thomas Duve ed., forthcoming). The book grew out of a 
workshop held at the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History 
(Frankfurt, Germany) in August 2012. 
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statehood provides an opportunity to briefly comment on the state 
of our legal history and historiography. In particular, I want to 
discuss the so-called “New Louisiana legal history” as articulated 
over the last three decades by Professors Warren M. Billings and 
Mark F. Fernandez. Their scholarship, with their allies, has made 
important individual contributions to a more nuanced history of 
our laws. But the revisionism of Billings and Fernandez is most 
wanting precisely where they been most critical; that is, with 
respect to comparative legal history. Indeed, I suggest that a 
renewed engagement with the old legal historians and their heirs is 
in order. 
Warren Billings and Mark Fernandez are both excellent 
historians with distinguished records in Louisiana history. A long-
time resident of the state, Billings is Professor Emeritus in the 
History Department of the University of New Orleans (UNO).3 He 
was the official historian of the Louisiana Supreme Court and was 
responsible for making their records available in the UNO 
archives. Fernandez, a native of Louisiana and once a student of 
Billings, is Professor of History at Loyola University New Orleans. 
Like Billings, he is also a past President of the Louisiana Historical 
Association.4 Both are elected fellows of the Louisiana Historical 
Association. The published roots of the “New Louisiana Legal 
                                                                                                             
 3. Warren M. Billings’ relevant works include: Louisiana Legal History 
and its Sources: Needs, Opportunities and Approaches in LOUISIANA’S LEGAL 
HERITAGE (Edward F. Haas ed., 1983); Book Review, 30 LA. HIST. 324 
(reviewing RICHARD H. KILBOURNE, HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: 
THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1803-1839 (1987)); Preface and Introduction, AN 
UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE: LAW AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS IN LOUISIANA 1803-
2003 (Judith K. Schafer & Warren M. Billings eds., Center for Louisiana 
Studies, University of Southwest Louisiana, Lafayette, La., 1997; published as 
VOL. 13, LOUISIANA PURCHASE BICENTENNIAL SERIES IN LOUISIANA STUDIES) 
[hereinafter AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE]; Mixed Jurisdictions and 
Convergence: The Louisiana Example, 29 INTL. J. LEG. INFO. 272 (2001). 
 4. Fernandez’s relevant works include: Louisiana Legal History: Past, 
Present, and Future in A LAW UNTO ITSELF? ESSAYS IN THE NEW LOUISIANA 
LEGAL HISTORY (Billings & Fernandez eds., LSU Press, Baton Rouge, La., 
2001) [hereinafter A LAW UNTO ITSELF?]; FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY: THE 
EVOLUTION OF LOUISIANA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM, 1712-1862 (LSU Press, Baton 
Rouge, La., 2001) [hereinafter FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY]. 
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History” lay in Billings’ Louisiana Legal History and its Sources: 
Needs, Opportunities and Approaches, published in Louisiana’s 
Legal Heritage (1983). There Billings launched a critique of the 
“lawyer-annalists” writing on Louisiana legal history and began to 
suggest that American legal history, like that of Virginia (on which 
he’d long specialized), was a better context than comparisons with 
continental legal traditions.5 The “New Louisiana Legal History” 
tag was developed in Billings’ review of Richard Kilbourne’s 
History of the Louisiana Civil Code (1989). There Billings both 
criticised and claimed Kilbourne, who must have been surprised to 
find that he’d been pressed into the ranks of the new historians.6 
Billings continued his critique and call-to-arms, now assisted by 
Fernandez, across the 1990s. Their agenda became still clearer 
over time: our legal history and historiography must, they argued, 
generally be set in a wider social context and especially within the 
broad contours of American legal history. The efforts of Billings 
and Fernandez culminated in the jointly-edited A Law unto Itself? 
Essays in the New Louisiana Legal History (2001) and, in the same 
year, Fernandez’s From Chaos to Continuity: The Evolution of 
Louisiana’s Judicial System, 1712-1862 (2001). 
II. CODES AND CONTEXTS 
The first plank of Billings’ and Fernandez’s critique is the 
insistence that we set our legal history and historiography in its 
broader social context. This call to place law in wider contexts—
without denying some level of autonomy for law—is to be 
welcomed. As Fernandez wrote a decade ago, in his introduction to 
A Law unto Itself?, it’s important not “to view law in a vacuum” 
and to employ instead “interpretive schemes that mingle social, 
                                                                                                             
 5. Billings, Introduction in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 
12. 
 6. Billings claimed that Kilbourne’s book was “among [the] first fruits” of 
the movement. Warren M. Billings, Book Review, 30 LA. HIST. 324 (reviewing 
RICHARD H. KILBOURNE, HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: THE 
FORMATIVE YEARS, 1803-1839 (1987)). 
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political, and intellectual history into modes of analysis that treat 
things legal as one strand in a complex cultural matrix.”7 
Professional historians rather than lawyers by training, Billings and 
Fernandez are certainly right to insist that trained historians have 
an important role to play in our legal history. It is a subject too 
important to be left to legal historians alone. If the “old legal 
historians” are never clearly identified, Louisiana legal historians 
have traditionally focused—with their counterparts throughout the 
West—on internal or doctrinal legal history.8 Given the 
dominance of external legal history in the United States over the 
last half-century—which attempts, like the “New Louisiana Legal 
History,” to place law in its wider economic, political, and social 
contexts—it is peculiar that it has taken so long for what Billings 
called a “sociocultural approach” to appear in the Bayou State.9 
 The laudable aim of a more meaningful social history of 
law has already produced some results. Billings and Fernandez are 
responsible, at least in part, for encouraging or publishing work in 
which scholars they include as fellow travelers in their “New 
Louisiana Legal History”—e.g., Florence M. Jumonville and 
Judith Kelleher Schafer—have taken their studies beyond codes 
and courtrooms. Indeed, A Law unto Itself? included not only a 
section on Judges and Courts, but essays on Books and the Law 
and Law in Society as well. With these last two sections in mind, 
Fernandez noted the importance of contributors who “mov[ed] past 
mere analyses of digests and codes to identify the books on which 
                                                                                                             
 7. Fernandez, Louisiana Legal History in A LAW UNTO ITSELF?, supra 
note 4, at 21. 
 8. Perhaps because of the acrimony of past debates, neither Billings nor 
Fernandez is usually very specific about their targets. Henry Plauché Dart gets 
the most attention, but he died in 1934. See Billings, Introduction in AN 
UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 14-15 and Mixed Jurisdictions and 
Convergence: The Louisiana Example, 29 INTL. J. LEG. INFO. 272, 296-297 
(2001). See also Billings, Louisiana Legal History and its Sources in 
LOUISIANA’S LEGAL HERITAGE, supra note 3, at 194-5. 
 9. Billings, Preface in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 6. 
For a recent comparison of British and American legal historians, see, e.g., 
Michael Lobban, The Varieties of Legal History, 5 CLIO@THÉMIS 1 (2012), 
available at http://www.cliothemis.com/The-Varieties-of-Legal-History.  
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lawyers and judges relied, to gauge their content, and to assess 
their impression on Louisiana law and its practice.”10 Even more 
important perhaps are those contributors who moved between legal 
and social history to investigate topics like slavery and the place of 
women in the nineteenth century.11 Ironically, however, the 
collection contains little that is explicitly comparative even within 
the American context that the new historians have championed. As 
one reviewer put it, “its essays amplify the title’s ambivalence by 
engaging only sporadically with the unifying theme of evaluating 
Louisiana legal history in larger context.”12 
 Indeed, the critique of Billings and Fernandez is not 
without problems. First, it may be a little unfair to portray 
inattention to social history as a failure of the lawyers. It’s hardly 
surprising, after all, that “[l]aw professors claimed legal history for 
their very own” or that histories written by lawyers would be, well, 
lawyerly.13 Instead, the absence of the social history of law that 
Billings and Fernandez demand might suggest negligence on the 
part of historians rather than jurists. More importantly, the legal 
history produced by Billings and Fernandez is itself court-centered, 
largely focused on judges and jurisprudence. It looks, in fact, little 
different from traditional Anglophone legal scholarship, what we 
                                                                                                             
 10. Fernandez, Louisiana Legal History in A LAW UNTO ITSELF?, supra 
note 4, at 17. 
 11. Others have gone further. See, e.g., DEREK N. KERR, PETTY FELONY, 
SLAVE DEFIANCE, AND FRONTIER VILLAINY: CRIME AND JUSTICE IN SPANISH 
LOUISIANA, 1770-1803 (Garland Publishing, New York, 1993); Sara Brooks 
Sundberg, Women and the Law of Property Under Louisiana Civil Law, 1782-
1835 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Louisiana State University, 2001); SHANNON L. 
DAWDY, BUILDING THE DEVIL’S EMPIRE: FRENCH COLONIAL NEW ORLEANS 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008); ANDREW MCMICHAEL, 
ATLANTIC LOYALTIES: AMERICANS IN SPANISH WEST FLORIDA 1785-1810 
(University of Georgia Press, Athens, Ga., 2008). Beyond Louisiana, see 
BROWN & DONLAN, THE LAWS AND OTHER LEGALITIES OF IRELAND, 1689-1850, 
supra note 1. 
 12. Christopher L. Doyle, Book Review, 1 J. EARLY REPUBL. 708 (review 
of Billings & Fernandez, A LAW UNTO ITSELF? ESSAYS IN THE NEW LOUISIANA 
LEGAL HISTORY (2001)). 
 13. Billings, Introduction in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 
15. 
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might call the “Old Anglo-American Legal History”. More 
problematically, especially when arguing for a social history of 
law, are the conclusions drawn from case law. For example, rather 
than an exploration of “social, political, and intellectual history,” 
Fernandez argued in From Chaos to Continuity that the 
“[e]xamination of … state courts … allows for a sweeping analysis 
of law, society, culture, politics, conflict, and consensus.”14 But 
surely this overstates the significance of the judiciary and case law. 
These are obviously an important part of the overall picture of our 
laws and of the “law in action”. But the study of case law is hardly 
“sociocultural” analysis at its best. Both the old and new historians 
would do well to take more seriously the call to “modes of analysis 
that treat things legal as one strand in a complex cultural matrix.”15  
The general thrust of modern socio-legal scholarship is that 
law, including but not limited to the courts, may reflect society, but 
it also has meaningful autonomy as well. The relationship is 
extraordinarily complex. But Billings wrote, in 1997, not only that 
“[c]ulture, society, and law are inextricably intertwined,” but 
that:16 
Ultimately law defines culture because it invests societies 
with their collective identities, which sets each off from 
another. Thus to examine even the most mundane facet of 
any legal order is to illuminate changes in society and its 
values through the passage of years.17 
Perhaps Billings misstated his view here or I’ve misunderstood, 
but the idea that “law defines culture” seems simplistic, if not 
naïve. Such an opinion has, of course, been held by older schools 
of legal historians who placed their legal traditions at the center of 
their cultures, not least long-standing views of Anglo-American 
legal exceptionalism. A continental European variant, reflecting 
                                                                                                             
 14. FERNANDEZ, FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY, supra note 4, at xii. 
 15. Fernandez, Louisiana Legal History in A LAW UNTO ITSELF?, supra note 
4, at 16. 
 16. Billings, Preface in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 7. 
 17. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
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the nationalism of the nineteenth century, was the mystical 
Volksgeist of the influential German “Historical School”. But such 
views have little connection to an extensive, comparative 
scholarship on the frequency of legal transplantation.18 It 
contradicts, too, the historical complexity and plurality of both 
laws and cultures throughout Western legal history.19  
III. COMPARISONS AND CONTEXTS 
The second aim of Billings and Fernandez is, as the latter put 
it, to “explore new methods and areas of research with the aim of 
tying the state’s legal history more closely to that of the South and 
to the nation as a whole” is a perfectly reasonable endeavor.20 
Billings had earlier written that the new historians: 
share a commitment to novel methods, a revisionist bent, 
rigorous manuscript research, and an astute incorporation 
of Louisiana’s legal history into the larger contexts of 
national legal history, Southern history, and American 
history in general.21 
This emphasis on the American context is rooted in the belief, 
shared by Billings and Fernandez, that scholarship on Louisiana 
legal history is not merely internal, but has tended to unnecessarily 
and problematically accentuate its uniqueness or “exceptionalism”, 
especially its relationship to continental legal sources. There is 
some truth to this. Writing on our links to continental legal 
                                                                                                             
 18. The obvious touchstone is ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN 
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed., University of Georgia Press, Athens, 
Ga., 1993). The debate is, however, quite extensive and complex. For additional 
titles, see Seán P. Donlan, The Mediterranean Hybridity Project: At the 
Boundaries of Law and Culture, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 355, 370-373 (2011).  
 19. See Seán P. Donlan, Remembering: Legal Hybridity and Legal History, 
2 COMP. L. REV. 1 (2011) and All This Together Make Up Our Common Law”: 
Legal Hybridity in England and Ireland, 1704-1804 in MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS 
AT NEW FRONTIERS (Esin Örücü ed., Windy, Simmonds, and Hill Publishing, 
London, 2010). 
 20. Fernandez, Louisiana Legal History in A LAW UNTO ITSELF?, supra note 
4, at 1. 
 21. Billings, Introduction in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 
17. 
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traditions, our legal historians have too often failed to attend to 
American parallels.22 Indeed, in this respect, much of Fernandez’s 
introduction to A Law unto Itself? is solid advice for the 
development of a richer legal history. But similarities, like 
differences, can be exaggerated. One partial perspective, or 
partiality, may simply replace another. I want to suggest that 
Billings and Fernandez appear confused about what the old legal 
historians—whoever they are—were doing, oscillate in their own 
appraisal of Louisiana law, and reveal important limitations in their 
understanding of the comparative analysis they reject.  
Billings is especially critical of “exceptionalism …”, the belief 
in the sui generis nature of Louisiana’s laws, “as the organizing 
principle of Louisiana legal history.”23 Elsewhere, he refers to 
“[t]he myth” that “French civil law [was] the marrow, the bone, 
and the spirit of Louisiana jurisprudence.”24 Perhaps there remain 
some lawyers and laypeople who believe this, but to conclude that 
it reflects the communis opinio of any generation of Louisiana’s 
legal historians is mistaken. In fact, it seems to conflate an 
argument largely about the uniqueness of Louisiana’s private law 
for more sweeping conclusions about the tradition as a whole. The 
“civilian renaissance” to which Billings refers was part of a wider 
                                                                                                             
 22. A number of recurring, admittedly important, questions still distract 
from more productive analyses. Ongoing debates in Louisiana legal history 
include, at least for the early nineteenth century: the status—mere digest or 
modern code—of the 1808 redaction; the character—whether French or 
Spanish—of the A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE 
TERRITORY OF ORLEANS (1808) [hereinafter DIGEST] and the role of the 1808 
redactors; the significance of the “De La Vergne volume” of the 1808 DIGEST; 
the character—whether continental or Anglo-American—of the jurisprudence; 
the general character—whether naturalist or positivist—of Louisiana law. For a 
similar list of debates, cf. Billings, Louisiana Legal History and its Sources in 
LOUISIANA’S LEGAL HERITAGE, supra note 3, at 195.  
 23. Billings, Preface in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 6. 
 24. Billings, Mixed Jurisdictions and Convergence, supra note 3, at 299. 
Indeed, Billings seems to want it both ways. He suggests that the Louisiana 
claim to uniqueness “speaks more to myth than to reality” while acknowledging, 
in the same paragraph, that Louisiana would become “a jurisdiction apart.” Id. at 
272, 273. Note, too, Billings’ odd contrast between the FRENCH CIVIL CODE OF 
1804 and the CODE NAPOLEON, id. at 280. 
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debate against those who argued, anticipating in many respects the 
new historians, that Louisiana was virtually indistinguishable from 
its fellow American jurisdictions.25 Indeed, the most heated debate 
of the past four decades was precisely over whether the Digest of 
1808 was best seen as redacting French or Spanish private law.26 
But neither camp denied Anglo-American transplants then or the 
progressive influence of Anglo-American law since. Of course, in 
Louisiana, as in other jurisdictions, legal history can be whiggish 
and shallow among the public, practitioners, and professors alike.27 
But if Billings contrasts “exceptionalism” with the idea that 
Louisiana is “an amalgamation of civil and common law precepts 
that commenced in 1803 and continued into the present,” I know of 
no scholar—certainly no living Louisiana legal historian—who 
maintains the former view.28 
This suggests a fundamental misunderstanding of the old legal 
historians—whoever they are—by at least some of the new 
historians. Similar to Billings, Fernandez makes an odd contrast 
between those who emphasized a “clash” of Anglo-American and 
continental legal traditions in the early nineteenth century and 
others who “walked a different route. [The latter] drew notice to a 
blend between civil and common law that made Louisiana a 
‘mixed jurisdiction.’”29 The point of the clash thesis in its various 
forms was, especially for the early nineteenth century, precisely to 
explain the generation of Louisiana’s mixed legal system, of which 
                                                                                                             
 25. Fernandez called the revival an “intellectual cul-de-sac,” Louisiana 
Legal History, supra note 4, at 9.  
 26. See especially Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its 
Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1971) and Robert 
Pascal, Sources of the Digest of the Civil Laws of 1808: A Reply to Professor 
Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 604 (1972). Forty years ago, this was described as a 
“tournament of scholars” in Joseph M. Sweeney, Tournament of Scholars Over 
the Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, 46 TUL. L. REV. 586 (1972).  
 27. The widespread belief that English common law was or is rooted in 
actual social custom is a well-known example. Cf. FERNANDEZ, FROM CHAOS TO 
CONTINUITY, supra note 4, at 112. 
 28. Billings, Preface in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 7.  
 29. Fernandez, Louisiana Legal History, supra note 4, at 12.  
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no one is in doubt.30 Again, writing about the attempt by some 
Louisianans to protect their continental private law, Fernandez 
states that “[t]he petitioners hoped to control efforts to admit 
Louisiana into the Union, and to undermine Claiborne’s efforts to 
create a mixed jurisdiction by securing civilian traditions.”31 
Assuming that this was Claiborne’s aim, it fails to appreciate the 
fact that whoever won (what certainly looks like a clash of some 
sort), the result would have been a mixed system. It’s only by 
securing the civilian traditions, in some manner at least, that a 
mixed jurisdiction could be created. It’s the nature of our mixture, 
not whether one was established, that has been the central question 
for Louisiana’s legal historians. 
The concept of a “clash of legal traditions” and cultures in the 
Territory of Orleans, by being defined in different ways by 
different writers with different perspectives and agendas, has 
admittedly created enduring problems for Louisiana legal history.32 
In 1983, Billings himself maintained that “[t]he rivalry between 
Louisiana law and American law after 1803 was no mere 
intellectual exercise for the edification and material benefit of 
lawyers; it is a conflict of culture in which Franco-Spanish 
Louisianans sought to preserve their identity.”33 He added that 
accommodation was found and “the story of that accommodation 
requires telling.”34 Both of these statements are in the mainstream 
of writing on Louisiana legal history. Since then, Billings and 
                                                                                                             
 30. This was quite explicitly the intention of GEORGE DARGO’S 
JEFFERSON’S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS (Rev. 
ed., The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., Clark, NJ, 2009), the most eloquent exponent 
of the clash thesis. Cf., however, his more moderate presentation in Dargo, The 
Digest of 1808: Historical Perspectives, 24 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L. FORUM 1 
(2009). 
 31. FERNANDEZ, FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY, supra note 4, at 24.  
 32. Contrary to Billings’ claim that “Samuel B. Groner introduced the 
‘clash of legal traditions’ thesis”, the idea extends back into the nineteenth 
century. See Billings, Introduction in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 
3, at 16. See also Groner, Louisiana Law: Its Development in the First Quarter-
Century of American Rule, 8 LA. L. REV. 350 (1947-8). 
 33. Billings, Louisiana Legal History and its Sources, supra note 3, at 199.  
 34. Id.  
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Fernandez have not so much presented a study of the confluence of 
legal cultures, but to claim that Anglo-American law was 
victorious early in the century, largely by virtue of the numbers of 
Anglo-Americans in the Bar and on the Bench.35 This is less 
accommodation than annexation.36 It can also rather easily be 
presented as a clash. More importantly, however, conflict and 
consensus, like clashes and continuities, aren’t mutually exclusive. 
Louisiana legal historians have never denied that an 
accommodation was made. The question was, to repeat myself, 
about the character of that accommodation. The suggestion of 
Billings and Fernandez seems to be that Louisianans developed not 
a mixed system, but “a Louisiana version of [Anglo-American] 
common law.”37 
Indeed, it appears that Billings and Fernandez don’t merely 
want us to attend to American—or Anglo-American—contexts, but 
dismiss other comparisons as irrelevant.38 But their conclusion is, 
                                                                                                             
 35. See Billings, Preface and Introduction in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, 
supra note 3, at 6, 16-17, and Fernandez, Louisiana Legal History, supra note 4, 
at 9-12. Kilbourne’s rejection of the clash thesis, at least in its most crude form, 
seems to have been an especially important influence on the new historians. His 
primary point was to deny that President Thomas Jefferson or William CC 
Clairborne, the Territorial Governor of Orleans, intended to suppress the local 
laws and replace them with Anglo-American law. See chapter one of RICHARD 
H. KILBOURNE, HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: THE FORMATIVE 
YEARS, 1803-1839 (Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University, Baton 
Rouge, La., 1987). There are, of course, more modest possibilities. I suggest that 
if the true motivations of the advocates of the common laws of Orleans and 
England cannot easily be divined, some amount of low-grade competition and 
anxiety clearly existed, at least with regard to private law (regulating land, 
matrimonial regimes, successions, etc.). This needn’t deny that Creoles and their 
allies probably had mixed motives: the stability of property and politics, the 
possibility of expediting statehood, as well as a genuine concern about the 
substance of the law and the culture to which it was attached. In any event, we 
must be cautious not to confuse rhetoric for reality. 
 36. Billings’ earlier article was more nuanced, noting both that Louisiana 
laws “set [them] off from their antecedents and the rest of the nation as well” 
and suggesting how “[t]he courts quickly became the forum in which the 
competing legal systems were harmonized.” Billings, Louisiana Legal History 
and its Sources, supra note 3, at 199.  
 37. FERNANDEZ, FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY, supra note 4, at 76. 
 38. Billings bemoaned the “preoccupation with comparative analysis” in 
Billings, Louisiana Legal History and its Sources, supra note 3, at 195. He 
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in part, rooted in inattention to and unfamiliarity with comparative 
legal history. Fernandez’s From Chaos to Continuity is especially 
problematic in this respect. The work contains careful, useful, and 
important research on Louisiana’s courts. But the wider legal 
context it presents, both Anglo-American and continental, relies on 
stereotypes and anachronisms.39 In discussing judicial practice in 
the aftermath of the Digest of 1808, for example, Fernandez states 
that Louisiana judges “deviated from traditional civilian practice in 
which the jurist’s main occupation consisted of applying 
appropriate code citations.”40 This idea, with that of “[a]n 
inflexible code”, is not merely unsubstantiated in modern 
continental legal practice, it wasn’t even an aspiration for the ius 
commune traditions of which French and Spanish Louisiana, the 
subsequent Orleans Territory, was a part.41 The Code Civil (1804) 
was only four years old and the formalism of the French 
“exegetical” approach, insofar as it actually applied even in France 
at the time, was a deviation from the complex balancing of legal 
texts, reason, and equity (i.e., équité) in continental adjudication. 
The employment of such shibboleths results in attributing existing 
commonalities between Anglo-American and continental law to 
evidence of borrowing from the former, missing the more 
significant fact that there were numerous parallel developments in 
                                                                                                             
 
suggested that being an “outsider” gave him a critical distance Louisianans 
didn’t have in understanding their laws. Id. 
 39. See Dargo, Book Review, H-LAW: H-NET REVIEWS, August 2002 
(reviewing MARK F. FERNANDEZ, FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY: THE 
EVOLUTION OF LOUISIANA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM, 1712-1862), available at 
www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=6645. 
 40. FERNANDEZ, FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY, supra note 4, at 33-34.  
 41. Id. at 61. Fernandez writes that such a code “embodying logic and 
efficiency, simply could not provide for the plethora of challenging questions 
that often arose before the bench.” Even assuming that the exegetical approach 
of a later generation in France accurately expressed the practice of the French 
courts, it’s odd to hear that such a codal regime, applied across France for over 
two centuries, couldn’t provide for the legal challenges of Louisiana. 
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both.42 That is, rather than seeing Louisiana as part of a wider 
American movement to codify, the American movement must 
itself be, and has often been, set within wider codification 
movements across the West.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Billings, Fernandez, and their allies have made important 
contributions to the study of Louisiana law and history. 
Collectively, they’ve edged us in the direction of a more 
meaningful social history of law. They’ve counseled us to pay 
closer attention to the American context of Louisiana’s laws, legal 
actors, and legal institutions. Following their suggestions will 
result in a much more nuanced image of our laws and better define 
the precise contours of our mixed tradition. But the revisionism of 
Billings and Fernandez is most wanting precisely where they been 
most critical, that is, with respect to comparative law and legal 
history. For all our faults, comparatists and legal historians can 
capture contexts that others—including talented historians—don’t. 
Billings and Fernandez might accomplish still more than they have 
with greater modesty, a closer reading of the scholarship of the old 
historians and their heirs, and a wider appreciation of comparative 
law, past and present. Perhaps in the wake of our bicentennial, we 
can find more constructive ways in which the old and the new 
historians can work together—in dialogue, collaborative projects, 
joint publications, etc—to the benefit of the subject we all hold 
dear.  
 
                                                                                                             
 42. See Fernandez’s comments on common law and custom, the ius 
commune and exegetical jurisprudence, stare decisis and jurisprudence 
constante in Civil Law and Common Law, an appendix to FROM CHAOS TO 
CONTINUITY, supra note 4.  
